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Abstract 
We investigate a long-run impact of a compound disaster in northern Taiwan by describing 
a recovery process from the disaster with a dynamic computable general equilibrium model. After 
simulating losses of capital and labor in combination with a nuclear power shutdown, we conduct 
policy experiments that are aimed at recovery of Taiwan’s major industries by subsidizing their 
output or capital use. We found that the semiconductor industry could recover but need a huge 
amount of subsidies while the electronic equipment sector could almost recover even without 
subsidies. Capital-use subsidies would cost less than output subsidies. When we use two-year 
longer duration for a recovery program of semiconductors, we could save the subsidy costs by 7–
10%. 
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1. Introduction 
Asia and the Pacific is the most natural hazard prone region owing to its geological 
environment and its rapid (Davis, 2014). Taiwan is one of the most vulnerable areas among many 
that are prone to natural disasters, especially earthquakes. It is a small island of 36,000 km2 with 
23 million people and hosts world-leading industrial sectors, such as semiconductors and electronic 
equipment. They are located in the Hsinchu Science Park in the northern area close to the capital, 
Taipei City. This area has two risk factors of disasters. First, the Shan-jiao fault runs through the 
semiconductor complex area. The second risk factor is nuclear power stations, which are located at 
coastal areas within 30 km from the capital. As we have learned in the Great East Japan 
Earthquake (GEJE) in 2011, a destructive tsunami caused by a huge earthquake can trigger a 
nuclear disaster and a power crisis, which could be termed a “compound disaster” (McEntire, 2006; 
Kawata, 2011). 
Electricity has long been indispensable input in Taiwan (Fukushige and Yamawaki, 2015), 
and it is important for modern industries, especially semiconductors, which is the flagship industry. 
On September 21, 1999, a magnitude (ML) 7.6 earthquake (hereinafter, the 921 earthquake) hit 
northern Taiwan, causing serious damage to communities and facilities, including the power 
network, and disrupting industrial activities for two weeks. The disaster incurred costs as high as 
14 billion USD or 3.3% of Taiwan’s GDP (Prater and Wu, 2002). The loss of semiconductor and 
electronic equipment manufacturing in the Hsinchu Science Park exceeded 10 billion TWD 
(Hsinchu Science Park, 2011). Taiwan has achieved further high growth after the 921 earthquake 
and thus could lose more from another compound disaster. 
Some impact analysis of actual and potential disasters have been made for Taiwan. Mai et 
al. (1999) quantified the macroeconomic impacts of the 921 Earthquake. Tsai and Chen (2011) 
conducted risk analysis of potential disasters for Taiwan’s tourism industry from an engineering 
viewpoint by using a geographic information system. Huang and Hosoe (2014) assessed the 
economic impact of a hypothetical ML 7.5 earthquake and a power crisis hitting manufacturing 
sectors of northern Taiwan by using a static computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. They 
found that the semiconductor, chemical, and pottery sectors, which are capital and/or energy 
intensive, would be affected most severely, the machinery and transportation equipment sectors 
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would be affected much less, and the power crisis would push up power prices by 27% to add up to 
an additional 16% of losses caused by the assumed earthquake alone. 
These estimates of damages and losses by disasters are useful for us to develop disaster-
impact mitigation plans and to examine their investment values. However, no matter how deeply 
and precisely we study the impact of a disaster, it cannot be prevented and thus would have some 
negative impacts on the economy. Given the occurrence of a disaster, we have to develop a recovery 
plan by studying recovery processes and policies that can minimize the disaster-induced losses 
and/or achieve a recovery goal at a minimum cost. After the 921 Earthquake, the Taiwanese 
government set up a 2-year recovery plan with a special budget of 200 billion TWD (Shieh, 2004). 
In a future disaster case, a similar amount would be requested. We have to assess what would 
happen in a recovery process after a disaster and what would need to be done for a better recovery. 
That is, we question what type of policy could achieve a recovery, how much fiscal costs would be 
needed, and how much social costs an economy would bear in the recovery process. 
On top of these questions, there is another issue about the timeframe for the recovery 
program. While people often prefer intensive and thus quick recovery, additional funds and social 
cots may be needed. In the case of the GEJE, a large portion of the special recovery budget was 
prepared after the event; the Board of Audit of Japan (2013) reported that about 10% of the budget 
for the first 2 years was misused or abused. In addition, inefficiency would result from interventions 
for recovery, and an intensive recovery program would bring about even larger distortions. 
Therefore, finally, the study addresses the question of how long recovery program duration should 
be. 
Studies on recovery process and policies after a disaster are scant for Taiwan although it 
potentially faces risks of various and serious disasters. Chen (2013) simulated a no-nuclear 
situation (but without considering any disasters) with a dynamic CGE model for Taiwan. Huang 
and Min (2002) investigated a recovery of inbound tourist flows after the 921 earthquake. While no 
economy-wide study for these questions exists for Taiwan’s disaster and recovery, the GEJE 
strongly motivated researchers to study recovery processes and policies for Japan. Okiyama et al. 
(2014) used a spatial CGE model to simulate the GEJE and studied efficient financing measures of 
reconstruction funds. Akune et al. (2013) used a dynamic CGE model to predict recovery time 
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needed for the fishery and the marine products industries, which were severely affected by the 
GEJE-induced compound disaster. These dynamic analyses for Japan, however, did not consider 
long-run effects of either a recovery program or its duration. 
To answer these questions, we develop a dynamic CGE model for Taiwan and simulate a 
huge earthquake that causes losses in capital and labor as well as a nuclear power shutdown in a 
compound disaster. To examine the costs and effectiveness of recovery policies, we consider two 
types of subsidies—a production subsidy and a capital-use subsidy—that are aimed at achieving a 
recovery of output levels in a few major industries in 10 years. We evaluate these policy 
interventions by measuring their fiscal and social costs by varying program duration. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our dynamic CGE model for 
Taiwan. Section 3 explains our simulation scenarios and simulation results. Section 4 summarizes 
our findings and their implications for a better recovery policy. 
 
2. Dynamic CGE Model and Simulation Method 
2.1 Intratemporal Model Structure 
We use a recursive dynamic CGE model for Taiwan that is developed on the basis of the 
static model by Huang and Hosoe (2014) with an extension made for recursive dynamics, à la Hosoe 
(2014). The model is explained in detail in these two articles, we explain only its major features 
below. The model distinguishes 22 sectors (Table 2.1). Figure 2.1 describes activities within a period 
with nested-constant elasticity of substitution/transformation (CES/CET) functions. They describe 
(1) substitution between capital and labor, (2) intermediate input and composite factor input with 
energy composite input for a production function of gross output, (3) transformation for domestic 
goods supply and exports, and (4) substitution between the domestic goods and imports, à la 
Armington (1969). (5) The Armington composite goods are used by a representative household and 
the government as well as for investment and intermediate input. (6) The household utility depends 
on consumption of various non-energy goods and an energy composite. 
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Table 2.1: Sectors and their Estimated Loss of Capital Stock and Total Labor Endowment 
Sector and its Abbreviation Damages on Capital in Period 0 
Capital Loss  
Agriculture AGR −1.3% 
Crude oil and natural gasa,b PAG −4.2% 
Mining MIN −1.9% 
Coala COA −5.7% 
Food FOD −3.9% 
Textiles and apparel TXA −7.1% 
Wood and paper WPP −9.6% 
Petroleuma,b PET −4.9% 
Chemical CHM −7.4% 
Pottery POT −6.3% 
Steel STL −5.8% 
Metal products MET −6.4% 
Semiconductors  SEC −11.6% 
Electronic equipment EEQ −11.0% 
Machinery  MCH −6.1% 
Transportation equipment  TEQ −4.1% 
Manufacturing  MAN −5.6% 
Electricitya,b ELY −16.3%c 
Town gasa,b TWG −5.8% 
Construction  CON −6.8% 
Transportation TRS −13.5% 
Service SRV −8.2% 
Labor Lossd −7.4% 
Note. Estimated by Huang and Hosoe (2014). 
a Energy sectors whose energy input is determined by fixed coefficients. In addition, their output is 
used for the production of energy composite goods for industries 
b Energy goods used for energy composite goods for households 
c This loss consists of the direct loss by the earthquake and the loss reflecting the nuclear power 
shutdown. 
d The labor loss is assumed to recover gradually in five periods. 
 
To describe substitution of electricity with other energy sources, which can be crucial in a 
power crisis induced by the nuclear power shutdown, we assume that (7) the energy composite for 
non-energy sectors is developed from the five energy goods indicated in Table 2.1, while we assume 
the conventional Leontief’s fixed coefficient technology for the five energy sectors. (8) In the energy 
composite for the household, petroleum, natural gas, electricity, and town gas (without coal) are 
used. The model is calibrated to Taiwan’s input-output (IO) table for 2006 (DGBAS, 2011a) with 
parameters summarized in Table 2.2.1 
 
                                                     
1 We conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to these assumed parameters to examine robustness of our 
results. Details are shown in the Appendix. 
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Figure 2.1: The CGE Model Structure within a Period 
 
Table 2.2: Assumed Parameters 
Parameter Value Source 
Rate of return of capital (ror) 5% Hosoe (2014) 
Depreciation rate (dep) 4% Chow and Lin (2002); 
Chang and Guan (2005) 
Population growth rate (pop) 1% DGBAS (2007) 
Armington elasticity parameters (σ, ψ) 0.90–7.35 GTAP Database version 8.1 (Hertel, 1997) 
Elasticity of substitution among energy 
sources (σe) 
1.1 Authors’ assumption 
Elasticity parameter in the investment 
function (2.1) (ς) 
1.0 Hosoe (2014) 
 
2.2 Intertemporal Model Structure 
 We depart from the earlier study with a static model by Huang and Hosoe (2014) by 
installing recursive dynamics in that model, which link economic activities between periods. In the 
t-th period, private savings 
p
tS , which are generated with a constant saving propensity, and foreign 
savings in the foreign currency 
f
tS  (converted to the local currency with an exchange rate t ) are 
spent in purchasing investment goods. These savings are allocated to purchase goods for sectoral 
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investment in the i-th sector tiII ,  according to its expected relative profitability among sectors in 
the next period, following Hosoe (2014). 
  fttpt
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tiCAP
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t SS
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     (2.1) 
where 
k
tp  denotes the price of composite investment goods, and 
f
tiCAPp 1,,   and 1,, tiCAPF  denote the 
price and the amount of capital service in the i-th sector in the next period, respectively. The last 
two variables can be replaced with the t-th period variables 
f
tiCAPp ,,  and   tjCAPFpop ,,1 , where 
pop denotes a population growth rate, by assuming a myopic expectation.   is an elasticity 
parameter that determines sensitivity of sectoral investment allocation to a gap of profitability 
among sectors. As we assume putty-clay type capital, capital cannot move from one sector to 
another instantaneously but moves sluggishly through capital accumulation. By contrast, labor is 
assumed to be mobile among sectors as assumed in many CGE models. 
 
2.3 Growth Paths 
 Through calibration to the IO table data and parameters that are summarized in Table 2.2, 
the model generates a path that is constantly growing at the population growth rate pop. Hereafter, 
this path is called the business-as-usual (BAU) path, which experiences no exogenous shocks or 
policies (Figure 2.2). We assume that the first period (period 0) experiences an ML 7.5 earthquake 
with a nuclear power shutdown, which Huang and Hosoe (2014) assumed to quantify their short-
run impacts with a static CGE model. By running the model recursively from period 0 to 30, we 
describe the long run consequence of the compound disaster without any policies for recovery as 
the base run. After computing the base run path, we compute growth paths under counter-factual 
scenarios with various policy interventions for recovery of some major sectors in Taiwan. Finally, 
we compare these counter-factual growth paths with the base run path to evaluate these policies. 
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Figure 2.2: Three Growth Paths for Comparative Dynamics 
 
2.4 Disaster Shocks: Earthquake and Nuclear Power Shutdown 
The hypothetical earthquake at the Shan-jiao fault is assumed to cause destruction of 
capital stock and unavailability of labor force. We use the estimates of their losses made by Huang 
and Hosoe (2014) for period 0. They estimated the capital losses based on the regional building 
collapse estimated by Taiwan Seismic Scenario Database with regional concentration data of 
affected industries (DGBAS, 2011b).2 The capital losses are assumed to occur exogenously only once 
in period 0 and can be recovered through endogenously-determined investment from period 1 as 
described by the sectoral investment function (2.1). The loss rates differ among sectors because 
capital intensity and spatial distribution are different among sectors (Table 2.1). 
The labor losses are assumed to occur in period 0 by 7.4 %, which is also estimated based 
on the building collapse and damage. The background assumption is that building collapse and 
damage render workplaces unavailable and, thus, a certain proportion of the labor force is 
unavailable. Note that the unavailability of the labor force does not mean only expected deaths and 
injuries in the earthquake, which are not high enough to cause macroeconomic impacts. As the 
collapsed or damaged buildings, in due course, would be rebuilt or fixed, labor unavailability is to 
                                                     
2 http://teles.ncree.org.tw/tssd/ 
Disaster 
A Counter-factual path 
(with a disaster & a recovery policy) 
The base run path 
(with a disaster) 
The Business-as-usual path 
(with no shock) 
t 
Output 
t=0 
Recovery 
Target Year 
t=10 
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be reduced gradually in the following five periods (i.e., by 25% every year). 
On top of these two factor losses, we assume a nuclear power shutdown in the compound 
disaster. By this assumption, it could be interpreted either that the earthquake and/or an 
earthquake-induced tsunami hits the nuclear power plants (but causes no serious nuclear disaster) 
or that the earthquake makes Taiwanese people concerned about a nuclear accident, causing them 
to call for the suspension or abolition of nuclear power plants. The nuclear power shutdown implies 
two impacts. One is further losses/unavailability of the capital stock of the nuclear power plants in 
the electric power sector. The assumed capital losses in the electric power industry in Table 2.1 is 
increased by this capital stock losses/unavailability. The other impact is increased fossil fuel uses 
to make up the losses of nuclear power generation just as Japan has experienced after the GEJE.3 
In our experiments, we assume that 138% more petroleum, 15% more coal, and 27% more natural 
gas are used to produce a unit of electricity. This is implemented in our simulations by adjusting 
their Leontief input coefficients in the electric power sector by this magnitude. 
 
2.5 Recovery Policy Scenarios 
 After a disaster, people often call for various measures of recovery for housing, food supply, 
medical service, employment and industrial activities, energy supply, and so on. In our 
macroeconomic simulations, we focus on the recovery of economic activities. Indeed, as a standard 
macroeconomic growth theory shows, aggregate output cannot recover perfectly from a shock in 
endowments and/or technological changes. Instead, in our multisectoral setup, we investigate 
policies that can achieve a recovery of output in some of the major sectors for Taiwan, such as 
semiconductors, electronic equipment, and chemicals. In addition, we investigate the possibility of 
recovery in the electric power sector, which is assumed to be hit seriously by a compound disaster. 
 Two types of subsidies are examined in our experiments. One is a production subsidy, which 
is expected to stimulate sectoral output to the desired level directly. The second type is a capital-
use subsidy. As the investment good allocation function (2.1) shows, the capital-use subsidy raises 
remuneration of capital, and, thus, attracts more investment in the target sector for quicker 
                                                     
3 Details about these loss estimates in capital, labor, and nuclear power are provided in Huang and Hosoe 
(2014). 
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recovery. We assume that these subsidies are financed by lump-sum direct taxes. 
 We set the recovery target year at period 10. While many periods are needed for recovery, 
the duration of recovery programs tend to be rather short. For example, the recovery budget was 
prepared only for the first 3 years, including the year when the 921 earthquake occurred in Taiwan. 
Three variations for the program duration are assumed: 3, 5, and 7 years. The government is 
assumed to provide a production subsidy or a capital-use subsidy for one of the target industries in 
these periods after the earthquake. For simplicity, their subsidy rates are assumed to be constant 
during the recovery program periods and are set high enough to achieve output recovery in each 
target sector at period 10 (Table 2.3). As we focus on the recovery of the four sectors from the 
compound disaster by means of the two types of subsidies with the three types of recovery program 
duration, we conduct 24 different experiments in our simulations. 
 
Table 2.3: Subsidy Rates Required for Recovery at Period 10 
 Production Subsidy Rate Capital-use Subsidy Rate 
3-year Recovery Program   
Semiconductor 12.0% 46.5% 
Electronic equipment 0.4% 4.5% 
Chemical 6.0% 47.9% 
Electricity 93.1% 98.8% 
5-year Recovery Program   
Semiconductor 7.4% 33.1% 
Electronic equipment 0.2% 2.6% 
Chemical 3.8% 34.5% 
Electricity 84.3% 97.6% 
7-year Recovery Program   
Semiconductor 5.3% 25.6% 
Electronic equipment 0.1% 1.8% 
Chemical 2.7% 26.7% 
Electricity  76.6% 95.8% 
 
3. Simulation Results 
3.1 The Base Run–Impacts of Compound Disaster 
 We use a multisectoral model and, thus, can see the impacts of disasters and the effects of 
policies not just on the target sector but also on other sectors. In Figure 3.1, thick lines show the 
paths of sectoral output in the base run (i.e., only a compound disaster) in terms of deviations from 
their BAU paths (i.e., no shocks). Output would decline in all the sectors except PET in period 0, as 
Huang and Hosoe (2014) predicted with a static CGE model. We investigate what would occur in 
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the subsequent periods with our dynamic CGE model. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Sectoral Output with and without Production Subsidies for Semiconductor Sector 
[Unit: deviations from the BAU, %] 
 
 The semiconductor sector (SEC), among many others, would suffer a very severe decline of 
more than 10% in period 0 and even after the recovery target year of period 10. Similarly, the 
chemical (CHM), pottery (POT), and electric power sectors (ELY) would suffer in the long run. In 
contrast, the textiles and apparel (TXA), metal (MET), electronic equipment (EEQ), machinery 
(MCH), transportation equipment (TEQ), and other manufacturing (MAN) sectors would recover 
in due course without any policy interventions. The petroleum sector (PET) alone would gain 
throughout our simulation periods owing to increased fossil fuel demand from the nuclear power 
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shutdown. From a macroeconomic viewpoint, the social losses, measured with the Hicksian 
equivalent variations, would reach 565 billion TWD in period 0 and 2.7 trillion TWD in periods 1–
10, which are comparable to 4.9% and 2.7% of the BAU GDP, respectively. 
 
3.2 Sectoral Impacts 
3.2.1 Impacts of Recovery Program for Semiconductor Sector 
Considering the importance of SEC in Taiwan, citizens could call for policies that would 
help or accelerate the sector’s recovery. The production subsidy would achieve a recovery quickly, 
with conspicuous overshooting of its output level compared with the BAU path (the panel in the far 
left of the fourth row of Figure 3.1). The shorter the recovery program duration is, the more marked 
its overshooting would be during the recovery program. After the program finishes, the SEC output 
level would fall sharply and become stable at the BAU level. These interventions would affect other 
sectors negatively, especially TXA, STL, EEQ, and MCH. This is because recovery of one sector 
could be achieved only by mobilizing resources—investment goods and the labor force—from other 
sectors. Direct taxes, which are raised to finance subsidies, would decrease household consumption 
as a whole. TXA has a significant share in the household consumption and thus would also suffer 
through this channel. They are the side effects of the recovery program. 
 Alternatively, when we use a capital-use subsidy for the SEC, its recovery paths would be 
smooth without any overshooting (the panel in the far left of the fourth row in Figure 3.2). The 
impact of this on other sectors would also be negative but smaller. As the capital-use subsidy can 
recover lost capital through the investment mechanism (2.1) directly, it works more efficiently than 
the production subsidy. 
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Figure 3.2: Sectoral Output with and without Capital-use Subsidies for Semiconductor Sector 
[Unit: deviations from the BAU, %] 
 
 By comparing costs of these different recovery programs, we can see efficiency of these 
programs (the left panel of Figure 3.3). A recovery program with longer duration, which requires 
lower subsidy rates, costs less. When we extend the program duration with production subsidies 
and capital-use subsidies from 3 years to 5 years, we could reduce its fiscal burden by 10% and 7%, 
respectively. The saved total fiscal costs of production subsidies (139 billion TWD) and capital-use 
subsidies (113 billion TWD) by extending the program duration from 3 years to 5 years are 
comparable to 0.1% of the BAU GDP in periods 1–10. Another extension of the program duration 
from 5 years to 7 years would cut the fiscal costs further in a similar magnitude. 
 The capital-use subsidy would costs 10, 8, and 7% less than the production subsidy in the 
3-, 5-, and 7-year programs, respectively. Finally, it should be noted that the total fiscal burden for 
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this single sector of SEC would exceed 1 trillion TWD while the annual government budget is 1.9 
trillion TWD in 2013, when no serious disaster hit Taiwan. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Total Fiscal (Left Panel) and Social Costs (Right Panel) of Recovery Programs for 
Semiconductor Sector with Production Subsidies (PRO) and Capital-use Subsidies (CAP) 
[unit: billion TWD] 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Note: The total fiscal costs and social costs measured by the Hicksian equivalent variations in 
Periods 1–10 discounted at a rate of 4%. 
 
The higher subsidy rates in the shorter recovery programs cause larger distortions in 
resource allocation and therefore incur additional social costs on top of those in the base run (the 
right panel of Figure 3.3). These subsidy programs would increase the social losses by more than 
5%. 
 
3.2.2 Impacts of Recovery Programs for Three Other Sectors 
 The output paths indicates that EEQ would achieve a recovery in period 11 (i.e., one period 
after the target period) without subsidies and, thus, would require only a little acceleration of its 
recovery by subsidies (Figures 3.4 and 3.5). The impact of subsidies for EEQ would be qualitatively 
similar to that discussed in the previous section for SEC. The smaller policy interventions would 
incur smaller fiscal and social costs (Figure 3.6). 
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Figure 3.4: Sectoral Output with and without Production Subsidies for Electronic Equipment Sector 
[Unit: deviations from the BAU, %] 
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Figure 3.5: Sectoral Output with and without Capital-use Subsidies for Electronic Equipment 
Sector 
[Unit: deviations from the BAU, %] 
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Figure 3.6: Total Fiscal (Left Panel) and Social Costs (Right Panel) of Recovery Programs for 
Electronic Equipment Sector with Production Subsidies (PRO) and Capital-use Subsidies (CAP) 
[unit: billion TWD] 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
In contrast to these two sectors, which could successfully recover by the subsidies, the 
chemical sector (CHM) could not achieve any sustainable recovery (the panel on the far left of the 
third row of Figures 3.7 and 3.8). That is, CHM indeed could recover its output level owing to heavy 
subsidies only temporally in period 10, but its output level in the following periods would be below 
the BAU output level. This contrast is because CHM is heavily dependent on PET input, which is 
used more intensively for power generation owing to its nuclear power shutdown. This input 
shortage blocks sustainable recovery of CHM.4 
 
                                                     
4 Even when we assume a very high subsidy rate, we could not maintain the output level above the BAU level 
in and after period 10 because, as Figures 3.7 and 3.8 indicate, the output growth paths converge to the base 
run level consistently. 
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Figure 3.7: Sectoral Output with and without Production Subsidies for Chemical Sector 
[Unit: deviations from the BAU, %] 
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Figure 3.8: Sectoral Output with and without Capital-use Subsidies for Chemical Sector 
[Unit: deviations from the BAU, %] 
 
 The electric power sector (ELY) would be hit so severely by the compound disaster that it 
could not achieve a recovery at all, even via very heavy subsidization of its output sales or capital 
usage (Figure 3.10). 
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Figure 3.10: Output of Electric Power Sector with and without Production Subsidies (PRO) 
(Left Panel) and Capital-use Subsidies (CAP) (Right Panel) 
[Unit: deviations from the BAU, %] 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we simulated a compound disaster to hit northern Taiwan, where capital and 
major industries are located, in a dynamic CGE framework. We focused on the recovery process of 
these industries and examined the effectiveness and efficiency of recovery programs with 
production or capital-use subsidies. Among the four sectors examined, SEC could achieve a 
sustainable recovery in 10 years with subsidies which, however, need a very larger special budget 
in light of the Taiwan’s annual budget. This indicates the full recovery of SEC would be too costly 
to pursue; we may have to be compromised and may have to pursue a more moderate recovery 
target. On the other hand, EEQ could recover with only a little help of subsidies. 
Regarding the recovery program schemes, capital-use subsidies would cost less than 
production subsidies. The latter would need high subsidy rates that cause overshooting in the 
recovery process and, thus, are inefficient. When the recovery program is designed to support SEC 
for 2 years longer with a lower subsidy rate, we can save the fiscal costs by 7–10%. As subsidies 
cause distortions in resource allocation, efficiency losses would follow the recovery program. It is 
noteworthy that we would bear an additional 3% of social losses for the recovery of SEC. This is 
equivalent to an annual burden as high as 37,411 TWD per household or 3.4% of household income. 
This is solely a political issue of whether people are willing to bear such large costs for the recovery 
of their flagship industry.  
While we could achieve a recovery of these two sectors, albeit sometimes at great cost, the 
energy-intensive sectors of CHM and ELY could not recover. The success or failure of their recovery 
would inevitably lead to the transformation of Taiwan’s industrial structure after a disaster. As 
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long as power supply is limited by a nuclear power shutdown, energy-intensive industries in the 
domestic economy could barely survive and would be replaced by other sectors that use less energy 
and/or could carry out offshoring of their production processes while maintaining their 
headquarters domestically. Such disaster-induced offshoring needs to be considered in a future 
analysis. 
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Appendix Sensitivity Analysis 
In CGE analysis, simulation results often depend on assumptions of key parameters. To 
examine the robustness of our results, sensitivity tests are conducted with respect to (1) the 
depreciation rate dep; (2) the rate of return of capital ror; (3) the population growth rate pop; (4) 
the elasticity parameter for investment allocationζ; (5) the elasticity of substitution among energy 
sources 𝜎e and (6) Armington’s (1969) elasticity of substitution/transformation 𝜎i/ψi . 
 We shifted these parameter values from those used in the main text (Table 2.2). The results 
generally show that our findings are qualitatively robust. Quantitatively, smaller fiscal and social 
costs would be generated by assuming a larger dep and ζ, which make investment and capital 
adjustment more flexible and with a larger pop, which makes capital less important. On the other 
hand, the impact of shifting ror, 𝜎i, ψi, and 𝜎e are found to be small. 
 
 
Figure A.1: Fiscal (Left Panel) and Social Costs (Right Panel) of Recovery Programs for 
Semiconductor Sector with Production Subsidies (PRO) and Capital-use Subsidies (CAP) with 
dep=0.05 
[unit: billion TWD] 
 
Note: The total fiscal costs and social costs measured by the Hicksian equivalent variations in 
Periods 1–10 are discounted at a rate of 4%. 
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Figure A.2: Fiscal (Left Panel) and Social Costs (Right Panel) of Recovery Programs for 
Semiconductor Sector with Production Subsidies (PRO) and Capital-use Subsidies (CAP) with 
ror=0.06 
[unit: billion TWD] 
 
 
Figure A.3: Fiscal (Left Panel) and Social Costs (Right Panel) of Recovery Programs for 
Semiconductor Sector with Production Subsidies (PRO) and Capital-use Subsidies (CAP) with 
pop=0.02 
[unit: billion TWD] 
 
 
Figure A.4: Fiscal (Left Panel) and Social Costs (Right Panel) of Recovery Programs for 
Semiconductor Sector with Production Subsidies (PRO) and Capital-use Subsidies (CAP) with ζ = 
2 
[unit: billion TWD] 
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Figure A.5: Fiscal (Left Panel) and Social Costs (Right Panel) of Recovery Programs for 
Semiconductor Sector with Production Subsidies (PRO) and Capital-use Subsidies (CAP) with 𝜎e = 
2 
[unit: billion TWD] 
 
 
Figure A.6: Fiscal (Left Panel) and Social Costs (Right Panel) of Recovery Programs for the 
Semiconductor Sector with Production Subsidies (PRO) and Capital-use Subsidies (CAP) with 30% 
smaller 𝜎i/ψi 
[unit: billion TWD] 
 
 
Figure A.7 Fiscal (Left Panel) and Social Costs (Right Panel) of Recovery Programs for 
Semiconductor Sector with Production Subsidies (PRO) and Capital-use Subsidies (CAP) with 30% 
larger 𝜎i/ψi 
[unit: billion TWD] 
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Annex Details of the Model 
 Although the model we developed is a dynamic model, we do not show the time suffix t for 
simplicity unless needed. 
 
Type of goods and factors, 
etc. in suffix 
Symbol Abbreviations 
Sectors i, j AGR, PAG, MIN, COA, FOD, TXA, WPP, PET, 
CHM, CHM, POT, STL, MET, SEC, EEQ, MCH, 
TEQ, MAN, ELY, TWG, CON, TRS, SRV 
Energy goods ei, ej PAG, PET, COA, ELY, TWG 
Non-energy goods for the 
industries 
ni, nj {i}\{ei} 
Energy goods for 
households 
ei2, ej2 PAG, PET, ELY, TWG 
Non-energy goods for the 
household 
ni2, nj2 {i}\{ei2} 
Non-electricity goods ne {i}\ELY 
Factor h, k CAP, LAB 
Mobile factor h_mob LAB 
Time period t 0, 1, 2, …, 30 
 
 
Endogenous variables 
𝑌𝑗 Composite factor used by the j-th sector 
𝐹ℎ,𝑗 The h-th factor input by the j-th sector 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 Intermediate input of the i-th good by the j-th sector 
𝑍𝑗 Output of the j-th good 
𝑋𝑖
𝑝
 Household consumption of the i-th good 
𝑋𝑖
𝑔
 Government consumption 
𝑋𝑖
𝑣 Input for composite investment good production 
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𝑋𝑖
𝑒 Energy composite used by the i-th sector 
𝑋𝑝𝑒 Energy composite used by the household  
𝐸𝑖 Exports of the i-th good 
𝑀𝑖 Imports of the i-th good 
𝑄𝑖 Armington's composite good 
𝐷𝑖 Domestic good 
𝑝ℎ,𝑗
𝑓
 Price of 𝐹ℎ,𝑗  
𝑝𝑗
𝑦
 Price of 𝑌𝑗 
𝑝𝑖
𝑒 Export price (in local currency) 
𝑝𝑖
𝑚 Import price (in local currency) 
𝑝𝑖
𝑑 Price of 𝐷𝑖 
𝑝𝑛𝑒
𝑥𝑒 Price of 𝑋𝑛𝑒
𝑒  
𝑝𝑥𝑝𝑒 Price of 𝑋𝑝𝑒 
𝑝𝑖
𝑞
 Price of 𝑄𝑖 
𝑝𝑗
𝑦
 Price of 𝑌𝑗 
𝑝𝑗
𝑧 Price of 𝑍𝑗 
𝑝𝑘  Price of the composite investment good, 𝐼𝐼𝐼  
ε Exchange rate 
𝑇𝑑 Direct tax revenue 
𝑇𝑗
𝑧 Production tax revenue from the j-th sector 
𝑇𝑖
𝑚 Import tariff revenue from the i-th good imports 
𝑇ℎ,𝑗
𝑓
 Factor tax revenue from the uses of the h-th factor by the j-th sector 
𝐼𝐼𝑖 Sectoral investment in the i-th sector 
𝐼𝐼𝐼 Composite investment good 
𝑆𝑝 Private saving 
𝐾𝐾𝑖 Capital stock in the i-th sector 
𝐶𝐶 Composite consumption or felicity 
𝐹𝐹ℎ,𝑗 Factor endowment of the h-th factor in the j-th sector 
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Exogenous variables 
𝜏𝑖
𝑧 Production tax rate 
𝜏𝑖
𝑚 Import tariff rate 
𝜏ℎ,𝑗
𝑓  Factor tax rate for the h-th factor use by the j-th sector 
𝑆𝑓 Foreign savings (in US dollars) 
𝑝𝑖
𝑊𝑒 World export price (in US dollars) 
𝑝𝑖
𝑊𝑚 World import price (in US dollars) 
 
Parameters  
𝜎𝑖 Armington’s elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic goods 
𝜎𝑒 Elasticity of substitution among energy sources 
𝜓𝑖 Elasticity of transformation between exports and domestic goods 
𝜂𝑖 Substitution elasticity parameter (= (𝜎𝑖 − 1)/𝜎𝑖) 
𝜙𝑖 Transformation elasticity parameter (= (𝜓𝑖 + 1)/𝜓𝑖) 
𝜒 Substitution elasticity of energy goods (=(𝜎𝑒 − 1)/𝜎𝑒) 
pop Population growth rate 
ror Rate of return of capital 
dep Depreciation rate 
ς Elasticity parameter for sectoral investment allocation 
 
[Domestic production] 
Composite factor production function (Cobb-Douglas) 
𝑌𝑗 =  𝑏𝑗 ∏ 𝐹ℎ,𝑗
𝛽ℎ,𝑗
ℎ
      ∀𝑗 
 
Factor demand function (Cobb-Douglas) 
𝐹ℎ,𝑗 =  
𝛽ℎ,𝑗𝑝𝑗
𝑦
(1 + 𝜏ℎ,𝑗
𝑓 ) 𝑝ℎ,𝑗
𝑓
𝑌𝑗       ∀ℎ, 𝑗 
Intermediate good demand function for non-electricity sectors 
𝑋𝑛𝑖,𝑛𝑒 = 𝑎𝑥𝑛𝑖,𝑛𝑒𝑍𝑛𝑒      ∀𝑛𝑖, 𝑛𝑒 
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The energy composite good demand function for the non-electricity sectors 
𝑋𝑛𝑒
𝑒 = 𝑎𝑥𝑛𝑒
𝑒 𝑍𝑛𝑒       ∀𝑛𝑒 
 
Intermediate good demand function for the electricity sector (ELY) 
𝑋𝑖,𝐸𝐿𝑌 = 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝐸𝐿𝑌𝑍𝐸𝐿𝑌      ∀𝑖 
 
The unit cost function for the non-electricity sectors 
𝑝𝑛𝑒
𝑧 = 𝑎𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑝𝑛𝑒
𝑦 + ∑ 𝑎𝑥𝑛𝑖,𝑛𝑒𝑝𝑛𝑒
𝑞
𝑛𝑖
+ 𝑎𝑥𝑛𝑒
𝑒 𝑝𝑛𝑒
𝑥𝑒       ∀𝑛𝑒 
 
The unit cost function for the electricity sector (ELY) 
𝑝𝐸𝐿𝑌
𝑧 = 𝑎𝑦𝐸𝐿𝑌𝑝𝐸𝐿𝑌
𝑦 + ∑ 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝐸𝐿𝑌𝑝𝑖
𝑞
𝑖
 
 
[Household consumption] 
Household demand of non-energy goods 
𝑋𝑛𝑖2
𝑝 =  
𝛼𝑛𝑖2
𝑝
𝑛𝑖2
𝑞 (∑ 𝑝ℎ,𝑗
𝑓
ℎ,𝑗 𝐹𝐹ℎ,𝑗 − 𝑆
𝑝 − 𝑇𝑑)      ∀𝑛𝑖2     
 
Household demand of the energy composite good 
𝑋𝑝𝑒 =
𝛼𝑒
𝑝𝑥𝑝𝑒
(∑ 𝑝ℎ,𝑗
𝑓 𝐹𝐹ℎ,𝑗 − 𝑆 − 𝑇
𝑑
ℎ,𝑗
) 
 
[Felicity/Composite consumption good production function] 
𝐶𝐶 = 𝑎 (∏ 𝑋𝑖
𝑝𝛼𝑖
𝑖
) (𝑋𝑝𝑒𝛼
𝑒
) 
 
[Energy Composite Aggregation] 
The energy composite aggregation function for the non-electricity sectors 
𝑋𝑛𝑒
𝑒 = 𝑜𝑛𝑒 (∑ 𝜅𝑒𝑖,𝑛𝑒𝑋𝑒𝑖,𝑛𝑒
𝜒
𝑒𝑖
)
1 𝜒⁄
      ∀𝑛𝑒 
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The energy good demand function for the non-electricity sectors 
𝑋𝑒𝑖,𝑛𝑒 = (
𝑜𝑛𝑒
𝜒𝜅𝑒𝑖,𝑛𝑒𝑝𝑛𝑒
𝑥𝑒
𝑝𝑒𝑖
𝑞 )
1 (1−𝜒)⁄
𝑋𝑛𝑒
𝑒       ∀𝑒𝑖, 𝑛𝑒 
 
The energy composite aggregation function for the household 
𝑋𝑝𝑒 = 𝑜𝑝 (∑ 𝜅𝑒𝑖2
𝑝 𝑋𝑒𝑖2
𝑝𝜒
𝑒𝑖2
)
1
𝜒⁄
 
 
The energy goods demand for the household 
𝑋𝑒𝑖2
𝑝 = (
𝑜𝑝
𝜒
𝜅𝑒𝑖2
𝑝 𝑝𝑥𝑝𝑒
𝑝𝑒𝑖2
𝑞 )
1
(1−𝜒)⁄
𝑋𝑝𝑒      ∀𝑒𝑖2 
 
[Government behavior] 
Factor tax revenue 
𝑇ℎ,𝑗
𝑓 = 𝜏ℎ,𝑗
𝑓 𝑝ℎ,𝑗
𝑓 𝐹ℎ,𝑗       ∀ℎ, 𝑗 
 
Lump-sum direct tax revenue 
𝑇𝑑 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑞𝑋𝑖
𝑔
𝑖
+ 𝑆𝑔 − ( ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑚
𝑖
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑧
𝑖
+  ∑ 𝑇ℎ,𝑗
𝑓
ℎ,𝑗
) 
 
Import tariff revenue 
𝑇𝑖
𝑚 = 𝜏𝑖
𝑚𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑀𝑖       ∀𝑖 
 
Indirect tax revenue 
𝑇𝑗
𝑧 = 𝜏𝑗
𝑧𝑝𝑗
𝑧𝑍𝑗       ∀𝑗 
 
[International Trade] 
Export and import prices and the exchange rate 
𝑝𝑖
𝑒 = 𝜀𝑝𝑖
𝑊𝑒       ∀𝑖 
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𝑝𝑖
𝑚 = 𝜀𝑝𝑖
𝑊𝑚       ∀𝑖 
 
Balance-of-payment constraint 
∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑊𝑒𝐸𝑖
𝑖
+ 𝑆𝑓 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑊𝑚𝑀
𝑖
 
 
Armington composite good production function 
𝑄𝑖 = 𝛾𝑖(𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑀𝑖
𝜂𝑖 + 𝛿𝑑𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝜂𝑖)1 𝜂𝑖⁄       ∀𝑖 
 
Import demand function 
𝑀𝑖 = (
𝛾𝑖
𝜂𝑖𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑞
(1 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑚)𝑝𝑖
𝑚)
1 (1−𝜂𝑖)⁄
𝑄𝑖       ∀𝑖 
 
Domestic good demand function 
𝐷𝑖 = (
𝛾𝑖
𝜂𝑖𝛿𝑑𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑞
𝑝𝑖
𝑑 )
1 (1−𝜂𝑖)⁄
𝑄𝑖       ∀𝑖 
 
Gross domestic output transformation function 
𝑍𝑖 = 𝜃𝑖(𝜉𝑒𝑖𝐸𝑖
𝜙𝑖 + 𝜉𝑑𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝜙𝑖)
1 𝜙𝑖⁄
      ∀𝑖 
 
Export supply function 
𝐸𝑖 = (
𝜃𝑖
𝜙𝑖𝜉𝑒𝑖(1 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑧)𝑝𝑖
𝑧
𝑝𝑖
𝑒 )
1 (1−𝜙𝑖)⁄
𝑍𝑖       ∀𝑖 
 
Domestic good supply function 
𝐷𝑖 = (
𝜃𝑖
𝜙𝑖𝜉𝑑𝑖(1 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑧)𝑝𝑖
𝑧
𝑝𝑖
𝑑 )
1 (1−𝜙𝑖)⁄
𝑍𝑖      ∀𝑖 
 
[Dynamic Equations] 
Composite investment good production function 
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𝐼𝐼𝐼 = ι∏ 𝑋𝑖
𝑣𝜆𝑖
𝑖
 
 
Sectoral investment allocation for the j-th sector 
𝑝𝑘𝐼𝐼𝑗 =
𝑝𝐶𝐴𝑃,𝑗
𝑓 𝜁𝐹𝐶𝐴𝑃,𝑗
∑ 𝑝𝐶𝐴𝑃,𝑖
𝑓 𝜁𝐹𝐶𝐴𝑃,𝑖𝑖
(𝑆𝑝 + 𝜀𝑆𝑓)      ∀𝑗 
 
Capital accumulation 
𝐾𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝑑𝑒𝑝)𝐾𝐾𝑗,𝑡 + 𝐼𝐼𝑗,𝑡       ∀𝑗, 𝑡 
 
[Market-clearing condition] 
Armington’s composite good market-clearing condition 
𝑄𝑖 =  𝑋𝑖
𝑝 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑔 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑣 + ∑ 𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑗
      ∀𝑖 
 
Capital service market-clearing condition 
𝐹𝐶𝐴𝑃,𝑗 = 𝑟𝑜𝑟𝐾𝐾𝑗       ∀𝑗 
 
Labor market-clearing condition 
∑ 𝐹ℎ_𝑚𝑜𝑏,𝑗
𝑗
= ∑ 𝐹𝐹ℎ_𝑚𝑜𝑏,𝑗
𝑗
      ∀ℎ_𝑚𝑜𝑏 
𝑝ℎ_𝑚𝑜𝑏,𝑗
𝑓 = 𝑝ℎ_𝑚𝑜𝑏,𝑖
𝑓       ∀ℎ_𝑚𝑜𝑏, 𝑖, 𝑗 
 
Investment good market-clearing condition 
∑ 𝐼𝐼𝑗 = 𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑗
 
 
